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Food ethics is on the rise, and this is thanks, in no small
part, to animal ethicists. Unlike some commentators, Anne
Barnhill, Mark Budolfson, and Tyler Doggett situate questions
about animals close to the core of the subdiscipline in their
introduction to The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics. Animal
ethicists should applaud this, and be quick to criticise those
food ethicists who overlook (questions about) our duties to
other animals. After all, animal ethics has long placed food
close to the centre of its concern. But, in turn, animal ethicists
should expect fair critique from philosophers of food if they
fail to take food seriously, just as Regan criticised Singer for
assuming away the value of food (The Case, §6.4). The ethical and philosophical significance of food does not begin and
end with harm to animals, and to talk about harm to animals
in food production without thinking seriously about food itself
is to risk the development of intellectually impoverished positions.
If one wants to think seriously about food ethics, especially
concerning the relationship it has to animal ethics, I would
struggle to think of a better starting place than The Oxford
Handbook of Food Ethics. Animals are rarely far from the
minds of the contributors, and any philosopher interested in
the ethics of veganism will find a great deal that is of interest
in the book’s pages.
The book contains eight sections: “Conventional Agriculture and Alternatives”; “Animals”; “Consumption”; “Food Justice and Social Justice”; “Ethics and Politics of Food Policy”;
“Gender, Body Image, and ‘Healthy’ Eating”; “Food and Social Identities, Cultural Practices, and Values”; and “History of
Philosophy and Food Ethics.” The amount of animal ethics in
the volume is belied by the fact that the “Animals” section con-
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tains only three essays. Two will not raise eyebrows for readers of BTS: Gary Comstock reviews cattle cognition to argue
that those in developed nations should not eat beef, while Eliot
Michaelson and Andrew Reisner offer a range of arguments
to conclude that we should not be eating fish or supporting the
fishing industry.
Charles List authors the other chapter in the section. He addresses the “new hunter”—the informed individual who hunts
out of a concern for animal welfare, food systems, and other social issues. He argues that new-hunter-ism does not obviously
do better than locavorism on animal-welfare or transparency
grounds. And he critically examines the new hunter’s concern
for feeling the “right” emotions when killing an animal, and
with engaging in “natural” processes. But List certainly does
not think that those who care about animal welfare, food systems, and relationships with animals should be vegan. He is
rightfully critical of some bad arguments in favour of hunting—“new” or “old”—but he firmly believes that hunting has
a cluster of merits. As well as providing “good healthy food”
(184), it can develop skills leading to virtues of ecological
awareness, emotional sensitivity to animals/habitats/the “wonders” (186) of nature, and the capacity to be good biotic citizens. List implores new hunters to exercise this final capacity,
and become “activists in defence of their biotic community”
(187). As far as I can tell, this activism is mostly geared around
ensuring that people can continue to hunt. There is little concern for animals, here. List thus diverges from the new hunters, who—misguidedly or otherwise—do have a concern for
humaneness. Indeed, in List’s conclusion, he talks of advocacy
not for humaneness, but for humanness (187). I assume this is
an error, but it is telling: List’s contribution feels like the most
“anti-animal” in the book.
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Real highlights for me are the three initial chapters in the
“Consumption” section. Tristram McPherson, Bob Fischer, and
Julia Nesky provide masterful and up-to-date reviews of, respectively, arguments for veganism, arguments for consuming
animal products, and the causal impotence of consumers. All
three are very strong essays; they would be stellar places to
begin a research project, or would make excellent additions to
reading lists.
McPherson focuses in on the wrongness of the killing and
suffering inherent in animal agriculture, but identifies the real
difficulty in extrapolating from this wrong to an individual
moral obligation to be vegan. There is, he says, a premise that
needs to be filled in: what is the relationship between one’s own
non-veganism and these wrongful harms? Possible answers include the following: we are (potentially or actually) individually responsible; we are collectively responsible; we benefit; we
are complicit. Even if this gap can be filled in, however, there
are a range of other challenges that vegan philosophers need to
resolve: McPherson hopes to “encourage others to rigorously
address these topics” (236).
Given the very low chance that any individual consumer impacts unethical production practices, why should we be vegan?
Nefsky rejects standard arguments about expected utility (“My
non-purchase might be the one that closes a farm!”) or indirectly making a difference (“I’ll make all my friends and family
vegan!”) with compelling arguments, and so non-instrumental
reasons in favour of veganism are canvassed. Meat-eaters (often) benefit from wrongdoing, but Nefsky is not convinced that
this a good reason to condemn them. Refusing meat may have
symbolic significance in a variety of ways, but these raise a
host of tricky puzzles. Ultimately, Nefsky argues that the best
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answer is the “naïve” one: refusing meat “makes real progress
to toward preventing gave harms or injustices”. The tricky—
even mysterious—part is “seeing how this could be true when
one’s [refusal] will not make a difference” (285).
Fischer, too, addresses causal inefficacy, among a range
of other issues. He helpfully identifies several key takeaways
from his wide review of arguments in defence of meat-eating:
the significance of animal deaths in arable agriculture; the
significance of non-traditional sources of animal products (invertebrates, in vitro meat, freeganism, etc.); the environmental
costs of animal agriculture; the relationship between abstract
rights and concrete practice; the potential virtue of embracing
one’s involvement with harm to animals (think, again, of List
and feeling the “right” thing); and the (in principle) distinction between innocuous use and problematic exploitation. Attention to these issues will provide the most compelling possible defences of the consumption of animal products, Fischer
claims. Indeed, he finishes by attempting just such a defence,
and forwards the imperative that we “eat unusually”: “there
appear to be good reasons to eat roadkill, bugs, bivalves, in
vitro meat, animal products that will be wasted, and the bodies
and byproducts of animals that live full, pleasant lives” (263).
Whether he is right or not, it is hard to argue with this conclusion.
McPherson, Nefsky, and Fischer’s contributions share a few
themes. One is the puzzle about how our individual dietary
choices are not likely to affect the food system. Another chapter that focuses on this is Andrew Chignell’s engaging paper—
ostensibly on religion and food—about how a hope (or faith)
that we can make a difference could allow us to overcome the
psychological barrier that our awareness of our own impotence
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can introduce. Paul B. Thompson’s reflections on agrarianism,
meanwhile, offer some tantalising tidbits about how to bypass
causal-impotence arguments altogether.
Another commonality between the chapters of McPherson,
Nefsky, and Fischer is that all provide powerful-but-sympathetic challenges to vegans. Mark Budolfson’s characteristically strong chapter does the same. He criticises the standard
idea that we should be promoting some given food system (e.g.,
a vegan system) because that would be the least harmful that
provides us with enough food. This, he thinks, is morally and
empirically dubious—morally because the food system of ideal
theory need not have a clear relationship with the food system
we should promote in non-ideal circumstances, and empirically because, even assuming “vegan values” (91), lots of vegan
foods are far less harmful, overall, than some non-vegan foods.
Budolfson’s example is mussels: they are (he says) non-sentient, and mussel-farming practices require little land or water,
and produce little by way of pollution, greenhouse-gas emissions, or harm to human workers. A tick for Fischer’s unusual
eating, it seems.
There are plenty of other chapters that contain material directly relevant to animal ethicists: Jeff Sebo’s consideration of
“multi-issue” food activism contains much on animal activism; Christina Van Dyke offers a useful reflection on the relationship between veganism and eating disorders; and readers
would be foolish to skip the final two chapters. The book closes
with Henrik Lagerlund on medieval food ethics and John Grey
and Aaron Garrett on “modern philosophical dietetics.” Both
pieces contain fascinating historical resources for thinking seriously about the normative status of animals and the ethics of
veganism. How many readers could call to mind Augustine’s
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rejection of vegetarianism, Maimonides’s justification for the
Jewish proscription on pork, Anne Conway’s comments on the
status of animals, or the vegetarian politics of John Oswald?
Even for the most ahistorical of animal ethicists, these arguments will be interesting.
All this said, I implore animal ethicists interested in food-related matters to take seriously even those chapters that are not,
at first glance, relevant to animal ethics. To borrow the words
of Susan Wolf, compared to the “weighty issues” relating to
animals, some topics of food ethics are “undeniably frivolous”
(722). But if we want to take food ethics seriously—and, if we
want to talk about food, we should—we must be aware of these
questions. As I’ve said, animal ethicists’ arguments about food
are impoverished if they do not take seriously the wider issues
of food ethics, which will, in any case, often reveal themselves
to be highly relevant for animal ethicists when explored in earnest.
Wolf addresses the ethics of being a foodie—and the encounter with the foodie will be one familiar to many vegans.
Shen-Yi Liao and Aaron Meskin’s excellent contribution on the
relationship between food ethics and food aesthetics is also relevant, here. The authors draw frequently on wrongs to animals,
and ultimately defend a position of “food immoralism,” according to which the morality of a food practice does have an impact upon its aesthetics, but that this need not always be a direct
relationship: the immorality of a food practice, depending on
the circumstances, can increase or decrease its aesthetic values, for instance. Foodies and aesthetes may often be defenders
of ethically dubious practices, but there’s no reason they should
inherently be so, and it is clear from these chapters that Wolf,
Liao, and Meskin treat issues relating to harm-to-animals with
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the scholarly seriousness they warrant. Even Thompson, in his
chapter on agrarian philosophy—another position we might
assume to be opposed to veganism—could not be accused of
ignoring or dismissing either animals or vegetarianism.
Karen Stohr and Sarah Conly address etiquette and paternalism respectively; neither mention animals, but both offer
engaging papers on core questions of food ethics, and precisely
the sort of thing animal ethicists serious about food should be
thinking about. I do not mean to criticise them for not mentioning animals, incidentally. As will—by now—be clear, the book
is replete with sympathetic, informed, and careful consideration
of animals. Only in a few places did I find myself frustrated by
such consideration’s absence. Jaclyn Hatala Matthes and Erich Hatala Matthes, it seemed, only reluctantly acknowledged
the wastefulness of animal agriculture in their chapter on food
waste. Kyle Powys Whyte, meanwhile, has an unfortunately
anthropocentric approach to food justice. It occurs, he tells us,
“when at least one human group systematically dominates one
or more other human groups through their connections to and
interactions with one another in local and global food systems”
(345). Whether this is the only time food injustice occurs in
Whyte’s eyes is unclear (cf. 12-3), but that the sentence twice
includes the word human gives an indication, I think, of where
Whyte’s sympathies lie. And the contribution on food labour
ethics, by Tyler Doggett and Seth M. Holmes, might frustrate
some readers with its references to how people are treated as
(or like) animals. It was an engaging read, though, and covers a
topic of undeniable importance.
The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics contains some 35
chapters across over 800 pages. There is thus a lot that I have
missed out of this review, though perhaps some of the other
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chapters will be of less interest to readers of BTS. My not mentioning a given chapter should not be taken as an indication that
it was not worth including, or is not worth reading. Indeed, in
contrast to other handbooks, I found few of the contributions
to be weak links—though, of course, any book of this length
is going to have some chapters weaker than others. And while,
perhaps, there are other topics that could have been included,
given the already impressive length of the book, I am not going
to criticise it on that account. Recall that this is a handbook, not
an encyclopedia.
In short, I thoroughly recommend The Oxford Handbook
of Food Ethics to all animal ethicists interested in addressing
food-related questions in their research or teaching. I have already made ample use of it in both my own teaching and my
own research. I have no doubt that I will continue to do so.
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